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Indigenous Law and Aboriginal Title
© Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School
August 12, 2016

This paper discusses the relevance of Indigenous law to Aboriginal title in Canada,
as revealed in three leading Supreme Court decisions: Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, 1 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, 2 and Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British
Columbia. 3 It concludes that Indigenous law relates to Aboriginal title in two
ways: it is part of the evidence that can be relied upon to establish the exclusive
occupation necessary for title at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, and it
continues thereafter to govern the communal land rights of the Aboriginal
titleholders. Moreover, the content of Indigenous law is not frozen at the moment
of Crown sovereignty – it is dynamic and alterable by the Indigenous people
concerned in accordance with their own system of governance.
This paper is extracted from a longer paper on St. Catherine’s Milling and
Lumber Company v. The Queen, 4 which is why the discussion of the three
Supreme Court decisions relates them to the Privy Council’s decision in that early
case.
1. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
As anyone reading this paper is probably familiar with the Delgamuukw case, I am
going to confine my discussion of it to Chief Justice Lamer’s treatment of the St.
Catherine’s decision and his elaboration of the sources and nature of Aboriginal
1

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw, S.C.C.].
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard].
3
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C.]
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(1888) 14 App. Cas. 46 [St. Catherine’s, P.C.].
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title. Regarding St. Catherine’s, he stated:
The starting point of the Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title is
the Privy Council’s decision in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber
Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, which described aboriginal
title as a “personal and usufructuary right” (at p. 54). The subsequent
jurisprudence has attempted to grapple with this definition, and has in
the process demonstrated that the Privy Council’s choice of
terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the various
dimensions of aboriginal title. What the Privy Council sought to
capture is that aboriginal title is a sui generis interest in land.
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to
distinguish it from “normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple.
However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that
its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either
to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property
found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it
must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal
perspectives. 5
On the “personal” aspect of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J. explained that this simply
means it is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown, not that it is “a nonproprietary interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the
land and cannot compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests”. 6
Turning to the source of Aboriginal title, he said that
... it had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal title in
Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see St. Catherine’s
Milling. However, it is now clear that although aboriginal title was
recognized by the Proclamation, it arises from the prior occupation of
Canada by aboriginal peoples. That prior occupation, however, is
relevant in two different ways, both of which illustrate the sui generis
nature of aboriginal title. The first is the physical fact of occupation,
which derives from the common law principle that occupation is proof
of possession in law.... Thus, in Guerin [Guerin v. The Queen, [1984]
2 S.C.R. 335] Dickson J. described aboriginal title, at p. 376, as a
5
6

Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 112.
Ibid. at para. 113, citing Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677.
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“legal right derived from the Indians’ historic occupation and
possession of their tribal lands”.... [I]n Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 322, ... this Court unanimously held at p. 340 that “aboriginal
title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British claims
of sovereignty” (also see Guerin at p. 378). What this suggests is a
second source for aboriginal title – the relationship between common
law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. 7
Chief Justice Lamer thus followed the Court’s rejection in Calder v. AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia 8 of the Privy Council’s ruling in St. Catherine’s that
Aboriginal title comes from the Royal Proclamation of 1763; instead, it is rooted in
pre-colonization occupation of land by the Indigenous peoples and in their preexisting systems of law.
At common law, Chief Justice Lamer explained, “the fact of physical
occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the
land”. 9 So if Aboriginal claimants are able to prove that they are descended from
or are the successors to Indigenous people who were in exclusive occupation of
specific lands at the time the British Crown asserted sovereignty, they will have
Aboriginal title in the absence of adequate proof by the Crown of subsequent
extinguishment of their title. 10 Indigenous law is relevant to proof of occupation
because an Indigenous land tenure system, laws governing land use, and trespass
laws, to give Lamer C.J.’s examples, could be relied upon to establish the

7

Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 114. Compare the concurring judgment of La Forest
J., especially at para. 190: “the aboriginal right of possession is derived from the historic
occupation and use of ancestral lands by aboriginal peoples. Put another way, ‘aboriginal title’ is
based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples’
traditional way of life.”
8
[1973] S.C.R. 313.
9
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 149. For detailed discussion, see McNeil, Common
Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
10
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1. On extinguishment, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of
Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33
Ottawa L. Rev. 301 [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”].
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exclusive occupation required for title. 11 But if the only use of Indigenous law is as
evidence of the occupation that grounds title at common law, can Indigenous law
really be a second source of Aboriginal title, as Lamer C.J. suggested? His
references to passages from Roberts v. Canada and Guerin in the quotation in the
preceding paragraph certainly imply that Indigenous systems of law that were in
existence at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty continued thereafter and
are relevant, not just as evidence of occupation at that time, but as a source of
Aboriginal title in their own right.12 However, his description of the content of
Aboriginal title is not consistent with what is known as the doctrine of continuity,
whereby Aboriginal title to land based on and defined by Indigenous laws and
customs pre-dated and continued after British colonization.13 If that doctrine
applied to Aboriginal title in Canada, one would expect the content of that title to
vary greatly in different parts of the country in accordance with the vast diversity
in Indigenous cultures and land use. Instead, the Chief Justice’s elaboration on the
content of Aboriginal title reveals that it is what Brian Slattery has described as a
generic right that does not vary from one Indigenous people to another. 14
On content as well as source, Chief Justice Lamer’s judgment also rejects
Lord Watson’s description of Aboriginal title in the St. Catherine’s case. In that
case, his Lordship not only referred to Aboriginal title as “a personal and
11

Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 148, 157.
The Guerin citation references the page where Dickson J. cited Amodu Tijani v. Secretary,
Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.), as authority that “a change in sovereignty over a
particular territory does not in general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants.”
13
See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979), 50-59; Mark D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of
Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999)
44 McGill L.J. 711; Kent McNeil and David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of
Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2nd)
177 at 203-11.
14
Brian Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and
Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 111 at 118.
12
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usufructuary right”, but also dismissed the federal government’s argument that the
Saulteaux had “the entire property of the land”, deciding instead that the “Crown
has all along had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which the Indian
title was a mere burden.” 15 Lamer C.J. avoided disagreeing directly with Lord
Watson by remarking that, although his Lordship “described the aboriginal title as
a ‘personal and usufructuary right’, [he] declined to explain what that meant
because it was not ‘necessary to express any opinion upon the point’”. 16 Admitting
that “the courts have been less than forthcoming” in defining Aboriginal title,
Lamer C.J. addressed the issue directly and concluded that
... the content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two
propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to
exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for
a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal
practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive
aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected uses must not be
irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s attachment to that land. 17
He expressly rejected the Crown’s argument that Aboriginal title is limited to
traditional uses of the land, deciding instead that it is an all-encompassing property
right that includes natural resources on and under the ground, subject only to an
inherent limit that prevents the land from being used in ways that are irreconcilable
with the relationship with the land giving rise to the Aboriginal title. 18
Consequently, the land cannot be put to uses that would destroy its unique value to
the Indigenous people in question, such as strip-mining a hunting ground or turning
land that has special ceremonial or cultural significance into a parking lot, but
15

St. Catherine’s, P.C., above note 4 at 54, 58.
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 116, quoting St. Catherine’s, P.C., above note 4 at
54, 55.
17
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 117.
18
For discussion, see “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 136 [McNeil, Emerging Justice?], 102.
16
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otherwise Aboriginal title “allows for a full range of uses of the land”. 19
So what role does Indigenous law play in relation to Aboriginal title, other
than as part of the evidence that can be relied upon to prove exclusive occupation
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty? While Chief Justice Lamer did not
answer this question, surely Indigenous law did not cease to exist at that moment,
to be instantaneously replaced by the common law and applicable statute law of
England. 20 Such a result would have created legal chaos in Indigenous
communities, as the law of England would have been unknown and unenforceable
there at the time. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court accepted that Crown
assertion of sovereignty in British Columbia took place in 1846, the year of the
Oregon Boundary Treaty that established the boundary between British and
American territory in the Pacific Northwest along the 49th parallel. 21 At the time,
there was very little British presence in the territories of the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Nations whose rights were in question in Delgamuukw, and certainly
19

Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 128, 132. Note that the inherent limit has been
modified somewhat in the Court’s more recent decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note
3 at para. 74, where McLachlin C.J. placed emphasis on forward-looking sustainability rather
than on backward-looking protection of the land for traditional uses: see Brian Slattery, “The
Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2d) 45 at 5863 [Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”].
20
For legal opinions that this did not happen to French law when English law was introduced in
Quebec by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, see C. Yorke and Wm de Grey, Report of Attorney
and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of Quebec, to the Lords of the Committee
of Council for Plantation Affairs in London, 14 April 1766, in Adam Shortt and Arthur G.
Doughty, Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791 (Ottawa: J. de
L. Taché, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1918), 251-57, especially 254-55;
Report of Solicitor General Alex. Wedderburn, 6 December 1772, ibid. at 424-37, especially
425; Report of Attorney General, Edwd. Thurlow, 22 January 1773, ibid. at 437-45, especially
440-44; Drulard v. Welsh (1906) 11 O.L.R. 647 (Ont. Div. Ct.), reversed on other grounds,
(1907) 14 O.L.R. 54 (Ont. C.A.).
21
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 145. For critical assessment, see Kent McNeil,
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian
Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power of Promises:
Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2008), 35.
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no British police officers, judges, or other government officials. Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en life carried on as before, necessarily governed by their own laws and
their own systems of governance. 22
Yet Aboriginal title to the lands exclusively occupied by the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en Nations vested in them the moment the Crown asserted sovereignty
in 1846.23 This title, as described by Chief Justice Lamer, gave them a right to
exclusive possession and use of the land that would, in principle, have been legally
enforceable from that time forward, disregarding the practical aspects involved in
enforcement against the Crown and third parties. Exclusivity as against the outside
world is the external dimension of Aboriginal title that allows it to “compete on an
equal footing with other proprietary interests”. 24 But in his judgment Lamer C.J.
did not explain how the right of possession and use that Aboriginal title confers
operates internally, other than to say that aboriginal title “is a collective right to
land held by all members of an aboriginal nation” and that “[d]ecisions with
respect to that land are also made by that community.” 25 The evidence presented at
trial revealed that, from time immemorial, the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en have had
complex systems of law that govern land holding and use within their
communities. 26 As both a practical and legal matter, those laws would have
22

See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1991) 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) [Delgamuukw,
B.C.S.C.], headings “5. The Historical Period” and “6. The Colony of British Columbia”.
23
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1, Lamer C.J. at para. 145: “aboriginal title crystallized at the
time sovereignty was asserted.” For reasons relating to the way the case was pleaded and the way
the trial judge dealt with the oral histories, the Supreme Court did not issue a declaration of title,
deciding instead to send the matter back to trial to determine what lands had been exclusively
occupied by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en in 1846. The case has not been retried.
24
Ibid. at para. 113.
25
Ibid. at para. 115.
26
See Delgamuukw, B.C.S.C., above note 22. See also Richard Overstall, “Encountering the
Spirit in the Land: ‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order”, in John McLaren, A.R. Buck,
and Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 22; Valerie Ruth Napoleon, “Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law,
and Legal Theory”, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009.
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continued in force after Crown assertion of sovereignty in 1846, and would
necessarily have been alterable by those nations through the exercise of their
decision-making authority, which given the communal nature of their rights would
have to be governmental in nature. 27
So “the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of
aboriginal law” that Chief Justice Lamer suggested “is a second source for
aboriginal title” 28 can be understood by taking into account the fact that Aboriginal
title has two dimensions, one external and the other internal. The external
dimension arises from exclusive occupation of land and the exclusive rights of
possession and use that the common law confers against the outside world.
Indigenous law can be used to help prove the exclusive occupation giving rise to
this external dimension, but it does not apply to define the rights externally. Nor
does it define the content of those rights, as the content does not vary from one
group of Indigenous people to another, regardless of variation in their legal orders.
It does, however, apply internally to govern the rights and authority of the
Aboriginal titleholders among themselves and in relation to others who seek to use

27

See Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255 at
270 [Slattery, “Metamorphosis”]; Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 19 at 52-54;
Jeremy Webber, “The Public Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights”, in Nigel Bankes
and Timo Koivurova, eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International
Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 79. Aboriginal
nations’ inherent right of self-government over their Aboriginal title lands was acknowledged by
Williamson J. in Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.): see discussion
in Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal
Coherence”, in Foster, Raven, and Webber, above note 14, 129 at 139-43. In House of Sga’nisim
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2 C.N.L.R. 82 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J. followed Campbell out
of comity, but also held that the governance provisions of the Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1998,
the validity of which was challenged in these cases, could be upheld as delegated governmental
authority. Smith J.’s decision was affirmed on appeal on the latter basis, without deciding the
inherent right issue: 2013 BCCA 49, [2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226, leave to appeal refused, [2013]
S.C.C.A. No. 44. For commentary, see Joshua Nichols, “A Reconciliation without Recollection?
Chief Mountain and the Sources of Sovereignty” (2015) 48 U.B.C. L. Rev. 515.
28
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 114.
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their lands. Indigenous law is therefore a source of their internal communal rights,
whereas the common law is a source of their external rights. Aboriginal title can
therefore only be understood by reference to both systems of law and by taking
into account the relationship between them. To repeat Chief Justice Lamer’s
words, “its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to
the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in
aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by
reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives.” 29 And given that it
would be impractical and even absurd for the Indigenous law governing internal
rights to be arbitrarily frozen at the moment of Crown assertion of sovereignty,
Aboriginal titleholders must have the authority to alter their laws in relation to land
as their societies and the environments in which they live change. This authority to
make and revise law is necessarily governmental.
2. R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard
R. v. Marshall and R. v. Bernard are companion cases arising out of prosecutions
under provincial legislation in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for illegal
harvesting and possession of timber from Crown land. The accused Mi’kmaqs
raised treaty rights and Aboriginal title as defences. The Supreme Court issued a
single judgment, rejecting these defences and upholding the convictions imposed at
trial. Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the main judgment, with Justice LeBel
delivering a judgment for himself and Justice Fish that concurred in result but
differed substantially in reasons. The focus of the judgments was on proof of
Aboriginal title, with all the judges agreeing that the evidence did not establish the
exclusive occupation of the cutting sites needed to prove Aboriginal title. 30
29
30

Ibid. at para. 112.
On whether the occupation needs to be site-specific, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in
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Given the focus on proof, McLachlin C.J. did not have a lot to say about the
sources and content of Aboriginal title. Nor did she mention the St. Catherine’s
case, even in the context of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which the accused
argued had “reserved to the Mi’kmaq title in all unceded, unpurchased land in the
former Nova Scotia, which later was divided into Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick.” 31 Without referring to either Calder or Delgamuukw in this context,
she affirmed the rulings in those decisions that the Proclamation is not an
independent source of Aboriginal title, implicitly deciding that it affirms preexisting rights rather than creating new ones. 32
Chief Justice McLachlin’s discussion of Aboriginal title emphasized the role
of the common law, starting with this statement: “Where title to lands formerly
occupied by an aboriginal people has not been surrendered, a claim for aboriginal
title to the land may be made under the common law.” 33 Relying on Delgamuukw,
she nonetheless acknowledged that, in assessing claims to Aboriginal title, “the
Court must consider both the aboriginal perspective and the common law
perspective.” 34 She then elaborated on what this means:
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to
examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that
practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modern legal
right.... This exercise involves both aboriginal and European
perspectives. The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice
from the perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a
common law right, the Court must also consider the European
perspective; the nature of the right at common law must be examined
to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it. 35
Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2012) 91 Can. Bar Rev. 745 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in
Canada”], and Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3.
31
Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 85.
32
LeBel and Fish JJ. concurred on this issue: ibid. at para. 111.
33
Ibid. at para. 38.
34
Ibid. at para. 46.
35
Ibid. at para. 48.
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She emphasized that “to insist that the pre-sovereignty practices correspond in
some broad sense to the modern right claimed, is not to ignore the aboriginal
perspective. The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every
step. It must be considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a generous
approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate modern right.” 36
In the passages just quoted, Chief Justice McLachlin was referring to
Aboriginal rights generally, but she then applied the same methodology of
translating practices into rights to Aboriginal title. “One of these rights”, she said,
“is aboriginal title to land. It is established by aboriginal practices that indicate
possession similar to that associated with title at common law. In matching
common law property rules to aboriginal practice we must be sensitive to the
context-specific nature of common law title, as well as the aboriginal
perspective.” 37 Sensitivity to the Aboriginal perspective involves evaluating the
practices from the point of view of the Aboriginal society and taking their manner
of life into account. McLachlin C.J. elaborated by quoting with approval the
following passage from La Forest J.’s concurring judgment in Delgamuukw:
... when dealing with a claim of “aboriginal title”, the court will focus
on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal
society’s traditional way of life. In pragmatic terms, this means
looking at the manner in which the society used the land to live,
namely to establish villages, to work, to get to work, to hunt, to travel
to hunting grounds, to fish, to get to fishing pools, to conduct religious
rites, etc. [Emphasis in original]. 38
But the practices must be sufficient to prove occupation as a matter of fact in order

36

Ibid. at para. 50.
Ibid. at para. 54.
38
Ibid. at para. 49, quoting from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 194.
37
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to be translated into title at common law, 39 and “‘[o]ccupation’ means ‘physical
occupation’. This ‘may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use
of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its
resources’.” 40
For the purposes of this paper, Chief Justice McLachlin’s judgment in
Marshall/Bernard is remarkable for a couple of reasons. First, it conflates proof of
Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights, so that both depend on historical
practices that are then translated into modern-day rights. While this methodology
may work for hunting, fishing, and wood harvesting rights that are usually based on
practices that give rise to these specific rights, 41 with all due respect I question its
application to Aboriginal title. 42 As we have seen, the common law source of
Aboriginal title is occupation of land, which is based in part on practices, but as
Chief Justice Lamer stated in Delgamuukw, it can also be established through proof
of Indigenous law, such trespass laws and laws governing land tenure and use. 43
When she said that “‘[o]ccupation’ means ‘physical occupation’”, McLachlin C.J.
disregarded the relevance of Indigenous law to proof of occupation. Moreover,
where Aboriginal title rather than other Aboriginal rights is concerned, it is not the
practices that get translated into rights; instead, the practices are evidence of
39

Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 54.
Ibid. at para. 56, McLachlin C.J. quoting in the last sentence from Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw,
S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 149.
41
Though Aboriginal rights are based on “practices, customs and traditions”, which can include
Indigenous laws (see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, Lamer C.J. at paras. 44-48,
McLachlin J., dissenting on other grounds, at paras. 263-69), in the numerous cases since Van
der Peet the focus of the evidence has usually been on practices: e.g. see R. v. Adams, [1996] 3
S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686; Lax
Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535.
42
For more detailed critical discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme
Court: What’s Happening?” (1996) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 281, especially at 297-300.
43
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 148, 157.
40
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occupation, which then gives rise to title. As we have seen, the title is uniform visà-vis the outside world – unlike other Aboriginal rights, its content does not depend
on the nature of the practices relied upon as evidence of the requisite occupation. 44
Secondly, McLachlin C.J. did not refer at all to the parts of Lamer C.J.’s
decision in Delgamuukw suggesting that Indigenous law and the relationship
between it and the common law are a second source of Aboriginal title. 45 From her
judgment in Marshall/Bernard, it appears that she thought there is only one source
of Aboriginal title – physical occupation of land. 46
While agreeing that there was not sufficient evidence to support findings of
Aboriginal title in Marshall/Bernard, Justice LeBel took a very different approach
to title that sheds light on its source. Like McLachlin C.J., he did not mention the
Privy Council decision in the St. Catherine’s case, but interestingly he did refer to
Ritchie C.J.’s judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada in the case, noting that the
Chief Justice had first used the concept of a usufruct “as an analogy to explain the
relationship between Crown and aboriginal interests in the land.... A usufructuary
title to all unsurrendered lands is understood to protect aboriginal peoples in the
absolute use and enjoyment of their lands.” 47 So although Indigenous land use
varied greatly in different parts of Canada, the “fact that a tract of land was used for
hunting instead of agriculture does not mean that the group did not possess the land
in such a way as to acquire aboriginal title.” 48 For LeBel J., the concept of a
usufruct therefore conferred the entire dominium utile on the Aboriginal
titleholders, regardless of the uses they made of the land prior to Crown assertion of
44

See text accompanying notes 14 and 17 above.
See the quotations from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1, accompanying notes 5 and 7
above.
46
For further discussion, see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada”, above note 30.
47
Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 135 [emphasis added], referring to St. Catharines
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1887) 13 S.C.R. 577.
48
Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 136.
45
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sovereignty.
On the Aboriginal perspective, Justice LeBel observed that “aboriginal
conceptions of territoriality, land-use and property should be used to modify and
adapt the traditional common law concepts of property in order to develop an
occupancy standard that incorporates both the aboriginal and common law
approaches.” 49 He acknowledged that “Aboriginal title has been recognized by the
common law and is in part defined by the common law, but it is grounded in
aboriginal customary laws relating to land. The interest is proprietary in nature and
is derived from inter-traditional notions of ownership.” 50 Addressing the matter of
source directly, he said that “aboriginal title arises from the prior possession of land
and the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on
that land.... It originates from ‘the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal
peoples’ and from ‘the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems
of aboriginal law’ (Delgamuukw, at para. 114).” 51 So unlike McLachlin C.J., Justice
LeBel relied expressly on Lamer C.J.’s articulation of the dual sources of
Aboriginal title in the common law and Indigenous law, and the relationship
between them. He also disagreed with her view that the role of the Aboriginal
perspective is “simply to help in the interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to
assess whether they conform to common law concepts of title.” 52 On the contrary,
he said, “[t]he aboriginal perspective shapes the very concept of aboriginal title”,
relying on John Borrows’ assertion that “Aboriginal law should not just be received
as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in the past on a piece of land. It
49
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is more than evidence: it is actually law.” 53
Justice LeBel therefore seems to have regarded the role of Indigenous law as
two-fold: it has to be taken into account in shaping the concept of Aboriginal title,
but it is also part of the Aboriginal perspective on the occupation necessary to
establish Aboriginal title. On the latter function, he stated in evident reference to
Lamer C.J.’s decision in Delgamuukw that the “aboriginal perspective on the
occupation of their land can also be gleaned in part, but not exclusively, from presovereignty systems of aboriginal law. The relevant laws consisted of elements of
the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples and might include a land
tenure system or laws governing land use.” 54 As we have seen, this function of
Indigenous law as evidence of occupation is an important aspect of Lamer C.J.’s
judgment that was ignored by Chief Justice McLachlin in her majority decision in
Marshall/Bernard. However, I am less sure of what Justice LeBel had in mind
when he said that the Aboriginal perspective, which includes Indigenous law,
“shapes the very concept of aboriginal title.” 55 As discussed above, the Aboriginal
title that Lamer C.J. described in Delgamuukw is generic in nature, and so does not
vary from one instance to another. Yet Indigenous law does vary greatly across
Canada, 56 so if that law shapes the concept of title one would expect the title to vary
as well. This cannot be what LeBel J. meant, as he relied heavily on Lamer C.J.’s
judgment and appears to have been critical of McLachlin C.J. for not following it
more closely. His remarks on the usufructuary nature of Aboriginal title cited earlier
also reveal that he regarded Aboriginal title as entailing the entire beneficial interest
53
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in the land, regardless of the Indigenous uses in the past. 57 Perhaps this apparent
tension in his judgment can be resolved by adopting the external/internal dichotomy
of Aboriginal title outlined above: vis-à-vis the outside world, Aboriginal title
entails generic rights that arise at common law from exclusive occupation, whereas
internally, Aboriginal title is governed by pre-existing Indigenous law that
continued after Crown assertion of sovereignty and is alterable through the exercise
of Indigenous peoples’ governance authority. 58
This brings us to the most recent Supreme Court decision on Aboriginal title,
Tsilhqot’in Nation, that resolved some but not all of the uncertainties in the earlier
jurisprudence.
3. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 59
As is well known, in Tsilhqot’in Nation the Supreme Court issued a declaration of
Aboriginal title for the first time in Canadian judicial history. This happened
because the factual record, based on extensive evidence presented at trial, led the
Supreme Court to accept the conclusion of Justice Vickers that the Tsilhqot’in had
proven their title over a large portion of the claim area in accordance with the test
laid down by the Court in Delgamuukw. 60
In her unanimous judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin settled a number of
57

See Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 136, where LeBel J. also stated (somewhat
enigmatically in my view) in reference to the concept of a usufruct that, “[i]f this form of
dominium utile is recognized as belonging to aboriginal peoples and the dominium directum is
considered to be in the Crown, then it seems to follow that the test for proof of aboriginal title
cannot simply reflect common law concepts of property and ownership.”
58
See Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights”, in Patrick Macklem and
Douglas Sanderson, eds., From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional
Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016),
100, especially at 104, 106; Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, above note 27 at 270; Slattery,
“Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 19 at 52-54.
59
Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3.
60
Ibid. at paras. 51-66.

17

issues, such as making clear that Aboriginal title is territorial rather than sitespecific, and deciding that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity no longer
operates to prevent provincial laws from applying to Aboriginal title lands. 61 She
did not refer to the St. Catherine’s case once in her judgment, instead starting her
historical review of the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights
with Calder. After summarizing the main principles from the case law governing
Aboriginal title and rights, and deciding that lack of precise delineation of the
territorial boundaries of Aboriginal title in the pleadings is not a reason for
dismissing title claims, 62 she moved on to the test for proving Aboriginal title.
Relying on Delgamuukw, she affirmed that Aboriginal title depends on proof of
exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, which in
British Columbia occurred in 1846. In so doing, she accepted that exclusive
occupation is the source of Aboriginal title.
In assessing whether the evidence has met the requirements for proof of
Aboriginal title – namely, sufficiency of occupation, continuity (where present
occupation is relied upon to show occupation at the time of Crown sovereignty),
and exclusivity – McLachlin C.J. cautioned that
... the court must be careful not to lose or distort the Aboriginal
perspective by forcing ancestral practices into the square boxes of
common law concepts, thus frustrating the goal of faithfully translating
pre-sovereignty Aboriginal interests into equivalent modern legal rights.
Sufficiency, continuity and exclusivity are not ends in themselves, but
inquiries that shed light on whether Aboriginal title is established. 63
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Turning to the sufficiency requirement, which she said “lies at the heart of
this appeal”, she said it “must be approached from both the common law
perspective and the Aboriginal perspective”, and that the “Aboriginal perspective
focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the group (Delgamuukw, at
para. 148).” 64 Inclusion of “laws” here is significant because, as we have seen, that
aspect of the Aboriginal perspective was not mentioned in her judgment in
Marshall/Bernard. The question, then, is what role do Indigenous laws play.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s discussion of the sufficiency requirement focuses
on actual presence on, control, and use of land:
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal
group in question must show that it has historically acted in a way that
would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own
purposes. This standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin to
proving a claim for adverse possession, but neither can the occupation
be purely subjective or internal. There must be evidence of a strong
presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of
occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that
the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the
exclusive stewardship of the claimant group. As just discussed, the kinds
of acts necessary to indicate a permanent presence and intention to hold
and use the land for the group’s purposes are dependent on the manner
of life of the people and the nature of the land. Cultivated fields,
constructed dwelling houses, invested labour, and a consistent presence
on parts of the land may be sufficient, but are not essential to establish
occupation. The notion of occupation must also reflect the way of life of
the Aboriginal people, including those who were nomadic or seminomadic. 65
Summing up, she said that
... what is required is a culturally sensitive approach to sufficiency of
occupation based on the dual perspectives of the Aboriginal group in
64
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question – its laws, practices, size, technological ability and the
character of the land claimed – and the common law notion of
possession as a basis for title.... The common law test for possession –
which requires an intention to occupy or hold land for the purposes of
the occupant – must be considered alongside the perspective of the
Aboriginal group which, depending on its size and manner of living,
might conceive of possession of land in a somewhat different manner
than did the common law. 66
At no point in her discussion did Chief Justice McLachlin explain how Indigenous
laws operate to establish sufficiency of occupation. They are part of the Aboriginal
perspective, presumably shedding light on the nature of the Indigenous people’s
relationship with the land. But the only concrete example of how Indigenous law relates
to the occupancy required for title was provided in her discussion of exclusivity, where
she quoted with approval the following passage from Lamer C.J.’s judgment in
Delgamuukw:
A consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead to the
conclusion that trespass by other aboriginal groups does not undermine,
and that presence of those groups by permission may reinforce, the
exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title. For
example, the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may
have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such that
the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against
exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may be
granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on
land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that
permission were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in
question, those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal
perspective. 67
It therefore appears that the role of Indigenous law is as evidence of the exclusive
occupation required for title. Nowhere in her judgment does McLachlin C.J. adopt
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Lamer C.J.’s suggestion in Delgamuukw that Indigenous law and the relationship
between it and the common law can be a second source of Aboriginal title.
So what happened to Tsilhqot’in law at the moment of Crown assertion of
sovereignty in 1846? Chief Justice McLachlin clearly envisaged its existence up to
then, but did not explain whether or how it operates from that time forward.
However, as demonstrated by the factual findings of Justice Vickers in Tsilhqot’in
Nation, the British presence in the Tsilhqot’in territory in 1846 was no greater than
in the territories of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en further north.68 The Oregon
Boundary Treaty of that year was really a non-event for the Tsilhqot’in, as they
continued to live by their laws and govern themselves thereafter. 69 So as discussed
above in relation to the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, internally the Tsilhqot’in’s
Aboriginal title must be sourced in and continue to be regulated by their own laws
and governance authority. And yet, in her discussion of the application of provincial
laws to their Aboriginal title lands, McLachlin C.J. suggested that there could be a
legal vacuum if provincial legislation was excluded by the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity. 70 What about Tsilhqot’in law? If it survived Crown
assertion of sovereignty and continued after 1846, as it must have, how and when
did it cease to be in effect? With respect, I think the Supreme Court has overlooked
these questions and failed to take the continuing application of Tsilhqot’in law and
governance authority into account. 71
Externally, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed the description of the nature
and content of Aboriginal title presented by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw. Relying on
Dickson J.’s judgment in Guerin, she stated:
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At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired
radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown
title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of
Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European
arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to
European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as
confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Aboriginal interest
in land that burdens the Crown’s underlying title is an independent legal
interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown. 72
From this passage, it appears that the Crown could acquire the radical or underlying
title to Tsilhqot’in lands by mere assertion, despite the fact that there was no British
governmental presence in the Tsilhqot’in territory and no way of enforcing English
law there. 73 But as discussed above, in principle this must mean that the
Tsilhqot’in’s Aboriginal title, which at common law also vested at same time in
1846,74 was protected by that law against the outside world, including the Crown,
from then on. 75 This is the external aspect of Aboriginal title. At the time, the
Crown’s underlying title would have been purely notional, whereas the internal
Aboriginal title of the Tsilhqot’in under their own laws and governance authority
would have been very real. But even after the Crown did establish its own
72
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governmental authority over the Tsilhqot’in territory, which may have occurred as a
result of the Chilcotin War in the 1860s, 76 Tsilhqot’in law and governance in
relation to land must have continued, both as a practical matter and as a matter of
law. There is no other way their Aboriginal title could have been operational on the
ground, as there would have been no applicable statute or common law to govern
their communal enjoyment and use of the land internally. 77
Chief Justice McLachlin went on to clarify what the Crown’s underlying title
amounts to:
The content of the Crown’s underlying title is what is left when
Aboriginal title is subtracted from it: s. 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867; Delgamuukw. As we have seen, Delgamuukw establishes that
Aboriginal title gives “the right to exclusive use and occupation of the
land ... for a variety of purposes”, not confined to traditional or
“distinctive” uses (para. 117). In other words, Aboriginal title is a
beneficial interest in the land: Guerin, at p. 382. In simple terms, the title
holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land – to use it,
enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As such, the Crown
does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal title land. 78
Aboriginal titleholders are therefore entitled to the entire benefit of the land,
whereas the Crown’s underlying title is limited to “two related elements – a
fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people when dealing with
Aboriginal lands, and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can
justify this in the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act,

76

See Tsilhqot’in Nation, B.C.S.C., above note 62 at paras. 267-86.
At common law, property rights are held by individuals and corporations, not by communities,
so there is no common law in relation to communal rights that could apply directly in this
context: see McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation”, above note 60 at 834-38, 860-71. Nor am I aware
of any colonial, provincial, or federal legislation that would have applied to govern the internal
dimension of Aboriginal title. Even today there is no such legislation, nor would it necessarily be
constitutional, which is one reason why Indigenous law must apply to govern Aboriginal title
internally: see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”, above note 61.
78
Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at para. 70.
77

23

1982.” 79 Fiduciary obligations and encroachment do not relate directly to the issues
of source, nature, and content of Aboriginal title – they involve constitutional issues
that are outside the scope of our present discussion. 80
Conclusion
In summary, the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision confirms that Aboriginal title comes
from exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, not
from the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It is proprietary in nature and encompasses
the entire beneficial interest in the land, subject to the inherent limit that the land
cannot be used in ways that will substantially deprive future generations of its
benefit. 81 The Crown’s underlying title has no beneficial content whatsoever. The
Aboriginal perspective, including Indigenous law, must be taken into account in
assessing claims to Aboriginal title, but it is unclear from Chief Justice McLachlin’s
judgment whether this law’s role is limited to being part of the evidence used to
prove exclusive occupation. As I have argued, Indigenous law and authority should
also govern the internal dimensions of Aboriginal title, while the common law
79

Ibid. at para. 71. In my respectful opinion, the power to encroach on Aboriginal title flows not
from the provincial Crown’s underlying proprietary title derived from s.109 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, but from its legislative authority under s.92 of that Act, especially s.92(13) which
empowers provincial legislatures to enact laws in relation to “Property and Civil Rights in the
Province”. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at paras. 102-03.
80
See Kent McNeil, “Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples”, in Mark R. Gillen and
Faye Woodman, eds., The Law of Trusts: A Contextual Approach, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond
Publishing, 2015), 839; Kent McNeil, “The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations in the Era of
Aboriginal Self-Government” (2009) 88 Can. Bar Rev. 1; McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the
Provinces”, above note 61.
81
McLachlin C.J. affirmed the inherent limit while modifying it so that it is less dependent on
traditional uses: see note 19 above. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, she said it
also applies in the context of government infringement of Aboriginal title: “The beneficial
interest in the land held by the Aboriginal group vests communally in the title-holding group.
This means that incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially
deprive future generations of the benefit of the land”: Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at
para. 86.

24

governs the rights of the Indigenous titleholders as against the outside world.

